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A "BLANK CHECK": JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
ThE WAR POwERS IN HAMDI v. RUMSFELD
I. INTRODUCTION
The September 11 th terrorist attacks compelled this nation to respond to its
enemies with military force. This "war on terror" presents important and
challenging legal questions. The potential for a subversive attack on American soil
and the possibility of United States citizens acting as terrorists raise constitutional
issues not previously encountered. In 2004, the Supreme Court addressed initial
questions arising from the war on terror in three cases. These cases dealt with the
rights of both citizens and non-citizens detained as a result of the war in
Afghanistan and domestic counter-terrorism operations. In particular, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld has significant implications for the impact of the war on terror on
Americans' civil liberties. The Court in Hamdi also provided guidance on the
judiciary's role in the war on terror.2 Historically, the Court has been reluctant to
exercise judicial review3 during times of war and has deferred to the Executive or
deemed cases non-justiciable political questions.4 Hamdi attempts to explain how
the Court will use judicial review during the current war.
In Hamdi, the Court found constitutional authority for the government to detain
American citizens as "enemy combatants," subject to the requirements of due
process.5 One of the nation's newspapers lauded the Court for affirming "the
principle that the president cannot suspend the rule of law during wartime and
simply lock people away."6 Many other newspapers similarly agreed with the
Supreme Court's apparent assertion ofjudicial review.7 However, these newspapers
failed to fully understand the practical effects of the Court's decision in Hamdi.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
2. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649-51.
3. As used in this Note, the term "judicial review" means "[a] court's power to review the actions
of other branches or levels of government; esp., the courts' power to invalidate legislative and executive
actions as being unconstitutional." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (7th ed. 1999).
4. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 182-86 (1996).
5. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640, 2648.
6. Editorial, No Blank Check, ST. LOUIS POST-DIsPATCH, June 29,2004, Five Star Late Lift ed.,
available at LEXIS, NEWS Library Slpd File.
7. See. e.g., Editorial, Enemy Combatants; High Point for High Court, PHILA. INQUIRER, June
29, 2004, at A18, available at 2004 WL 84019484 (discussing the need for judicial review in light of
the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal); Editorial, Supreme Rebuke, WASH. POST, June 29, 2004, at A22,
available at LEXIS, NEWS Library wpost File (stating that the Court's decision "sends a powerful
message that Americans cannot just disappear at the hands of their government"). But see Supreme
Foolishness, N.Y. POST, June 29, 2004, at 28, available at LEXIS, NEWS Library Nypost File
(arguing that the Court's decision does not "realize that the War on Terror is a different kind of war"
requiring the actions of a strong executive branch).
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In Hamdi, the Supreme Court made strong statements supporting the exercise
of judicial review over the war powers, specifically when the exercise of such
powers infringes on the individual rights of United States citizens. This Note
argues that, despite the Court's apparent support of judicial review, the practical
effect of its decision grants broad deference to the political branches' use of their
war powers. By declaring in this case that a role for judicial review exists, the
Court leaves a superficial impression of limiting the President's use of the war
powers. The decision instead continues the traditional deference and does little to
limit the President's ability to detain citizens under the war powers. The Court
contradicts its apparent support for judicial power by showing deference to the
political branches' war powers in three ways: 1) interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
broadly, 2) relying onExparte Quirin and broadly construing its precedential value,
and 3) establishing a due process regime that strongly favors the government.
Part II of this Note discusses the background and reasoning of the Supreme
Court decision in Hamdi. Part III examines Hamdi's place in the war powers
jurisprudence, particularly in relation to the Court's history of deference to the
political branches' exercise of the war powers, and then discusses three of the
Court's holdings and how each defers to the war powers. Part IV analyzes the
Court's construction of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and argues that the Court's decision to
interpret that statute broadly, when a stronger, narrower interpretation exists, shows
deference to the Executive. Part V argues that the Court's reliance on Ex parte
Quirin demonstrates deference to the war powers by amplifying that case's
precedential value and embellishing its holding. Finally, Part VI discusses the
Court's interpretation of due process requirements in Hamdi and contends that the
due process regime the Court recommended provides only nominal protection for
citizens seeking to challenge their detention.
II. BACKGROUND OF HAMDI
A. Facts
On September 18,2001, Congress passed an Authorization for Use of Military
Force.8 This simple statement provided authorization for the President to use "all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines" were involved in the September 1 lth terrorist attacks.9 The Act also
8. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
9. Id. § 2(a) states:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.
[Vol. 56:581
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provided authority to take action against any nation harboring terrorists or terrorist
organizations.'" Pursuant to this authorization, the President initiated military force
in Afghanistan against the Taliban government and al Qaeda, an important terrorist
organization with operations in the country.
The Northern Alliance, a military organization fighting against the Taliban
government, captured Yaser Esam Hamdi in Afghanistan in 2001. Hamdi was an
American citizen born in Louisiana. 3 The Northern Alliance subsequently
transferred Hamdi to the United States military, who, after interrogating Hamdi,
determined he was associated with the Taliban and classified him as an "enemy
combatant."' 4 These determinations led the military to believe Hamdi required
further detention.' The government initially detained Hamdi at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, but later transferred him to naval brigs in Virginia and South Carolina after
learning he was a United States citizen. 6 The government placed Hamdi in solitary
confinement, and a civilian court or military tribunal never evaluated his detention.' 7
B. Procedural History
Harndi's father initiated a next-friend petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court in June 2002." The district court initially ordered the
government to provide Hamdi with access to legal counsel, but the Fourth Circuit
reversed the order in deference to the "government's security and intelligence
interests."' 9 When the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, the
government moved to dismiss the petition.20 In support of its motion, the
government provided a declaration from Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the
Undersecretary for Defense Policy.2 Mobbs stated that he was "'substantially
involved' with both the detention of enemy combatants and military operations
against al Qaeda.22 The so-called "Mobbs Declaration" outlined the factual
circumstances supporting Hamdi's capture and the government's enemy combatant
10. Id.
11. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2635-36. Brief for the Respondents at4-5, Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)
(No. 03-6696).
15. Brief for the Respondents at 5, Hamdi (No. 03-6696).
16. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636.
17. Brief for Petitioners at 6-7, Hamdi v. Rumnsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
18. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636.
19. Handi v. Runsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633,2636 (2004).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2636-37.
22. Id. at 2637.
2005]
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classification.23 Mobbs, however, was not present at Hamdi's capture or
interrogation.24
Before the district court proceeded on the government's motion to dismiss, the
Fourth Circuit ordered it "to [first] consider the sufficiency of the Mobbs
Declaration... "'25 The district court found the Mobbs Declaration insufficient to
provide the sole basis for detention because it was "little more than the government
'say-so. ' ' '26 The district court also ordered the government to produce more
evidence to support Hamdi's detention. 27  The court concluded that more
information was necessary to facilitate "meaningful judicial review."28
Reversing the lower court, the Fourth Circuit held the Mobbs Declaration
sufficient to support Hamdi's classification and detention.29 Citing the history of
judicial deference to the political branches during wartime, 0 the Fourth Circuit held
that "[a]sking the executive to provide more detailed factual assertions would be to
wade further into the conduct of war than we consider appropriate and is
unnecessary to a meaningful judicial review of this question."'" Because, according
to the court, Hamdi's detention derived from the political branches' war powers,
separation of powers prevented the judiciary from going beyond the government's
factual allegation.32 Thus, the factual allegations in the Mobbs Declaration were
sufficient to provide a basis for Hamdi's detention.33
The Fourth Circuit also addressed Hamdi's argument that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
prohibited his detention.34 Section 4001(a) provides that the government cannot
detain a United States citizen without authorization by Congressional act.35
Rejecting this argument, the court found that the Authorization for Use of Military
Force satisfied the statute's requirement.36
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Hamdi's argument that his United States
citizenship precluded the government from holding him as an enemy combatant. 3
According to the court, a citizen could be an enemy combatant to the same extent
as anon-citizen. a Citing earlier Supreme Court cases, the Fourth Circuit concluded
23. Brief for the Respondents at 6-7, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
24. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2637.
25. Id.
26. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (E.D. Va. 2002).
27. Id. at 528-29.
28. Id. at 532.
29. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2003).
30. Id. at 462-64.
31. Id. at 473.
32. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2004).
33. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473.
34. Id. at 467-68.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1971). Section 4001(a) states "No citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."
36. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 467.
37. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,475 (4th Cir. 2003).
38. Id.
[Vol. 56: 581
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"that '[c]itizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him
from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful."' 39
C. The Supreme Court's Analysis in Hamdi
The Supreme Court took a broader approach to the legal questions in Hamdi.
While the Fourth Circuit used the narrow question of the Mobbs Declaration's
sufficiency as a framework for its decision, the Supreme Court did not limit its
analysis to that question. The Court analyzed two major issues: 1) whether the
government has the statutory and constitutional power to indefinitely detain an
American citizen as an enemy combatant and 2) to what extent due process rights
protect a person challenging their enemy combatant status.'
1. The Statutory Authority to Detain Citizens
Before reaching the constitutional question, the plurality first considered
whether the Authorization for Use of Military Force satisfied § 4001(a). Hamdi
argued that Congress adopted the statute to require a specific grant of authority
before the government could detain citizens and that a declaration of war, in itself,
is not sufficient.4 Using the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, the Court construed the
text of the Authorization to permit the detention of persons associated with the
Taliban.42 The plurality found that detaining persons engaged in fighting against
U.S. forces "is a fundamental incident of waging war" such that the Authorization's
"necessary and appropriate" language must encompass their detention.43 A citizen
could be engaged in fighting against U.S. forces just as a non-citizen could.
44
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, disagreed with the plurality's view
on this issue.4 First, he argued the circumstances of § 4001(a)'s passage
demonstrate that Congress intended to require a specific grant of authority."
Congress passed the statute in 1971 to replace the Emergency Detention Act of
1950.47 The old detention statute permitted the Attorney General "to detain anyone
reasonably thought likely to engage in espionage or sabotage."' Congress therefore
intended § 4001 (a) generally to curb the President's power to detain and specifically
to prevent the possibility of another internment like those of Japanese Americans
39. Id. (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942)).
40. Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2004).
41. Brief for Petitioners at 44-45, Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
42. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2641-42.
45. Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2654.
47. Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2654 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
48. Id.
20051
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during World War I1." This history, Justice Souter argued, shows that Congress
intended the statute to require an act granting the President specific power to detain
American citizens.s
Second, Justice Souter reasoned that § 4001 (a) was enacted when the Supreme
Court subjected wartime limitations on liberty to heightened standards of clarity."'
As enunciated in Ex parte Endo, Congressional enactrnents during a time of war
require interpretation "'to allow for the greatest possible accommodation' of
liberty. 2 Congress was aware of this interpretive scheme and therefore realized that
clear authorization would be necessary to confer power to detain citizens. 3 Finally,
Justice Souter argued the lessons of Japanese internment during World War II
support requiring specific authority.54 Those detentions show the Executive is not
well-suited to reconcile liberty with his primary responsibility to maintain security.55
Requiring Congress to provide a specific authorization would serve to check the
Executive.56
The Court qualified the power to detain that the Authorization granted by
stating that the Authorization did not permit "indefinite" detention.5 7 Rather, the
Authorization only allows the detention of citizens "for the duration of the relevant
conflict." 8 Indeed, the Court's explanation of the power to detain is narrowly
comparable with the position Justice Thomas supported. Justice Thomas argued
that the plurality erroneously relied on irrelevant treaties to qualify the power to
detain. 9 The government, according to Justice Thomas, can detain enemy
combatants for as long as the war continues.6" Furthermore, Justice Thomas stated
the judiciary is "bound by the political branches' determination that the United
States is at war," which could extend beyond actual fighting.6 Justice Thomas does
not appear to limit the power to detain by any geographical measure.62 In contrast,
the plurality stated that detention is only appropriate so long as the "relevant
conflict" continues.63 The "relevant conflict," according to the plurality, is not the
overall war on terror, but rather, the more narrow conflict in Afghanistan." The
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2655.
52. Id. (quoting Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944)).
53. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2004).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2641.
59. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2679 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 2641.
64. Id. at 2641-42.
[Vol. 56: 581
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Court reasoned that Hamdi's detention is within the time period allowed by the
Authorization, because the conflict in Afghanistan is ongoing.6"
2. The Constitutional Power to Detain Citizens as "Enemy Combatants"
The plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor," proceeds from the
standpoint that the President and Congress are in agreement on detaining citizens
as enemy combatants. 67 The Court uses the Authorization for Use of Military Force
to support this proposition. 8 This agreement is important for the reasons outlined
in Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.69 As
Justice Jackson wrote, the President's "authority is at its maximum" when he acts
with congressional authority, "for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate."70  The President's actions are usually
unconstitutional in this situation only if "the Federal Government as an undivided
whole lacks power."71 By finding authorization for Hamdi's detention in the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, the Court did not have to deal with the
issue of the allocation of war powers to and among each of the political branches.
Therefore, the Court decided the issue in the broadest constitutional sense.72
65. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2004). This conclusion does not mean the
"duration of the relevant conflict" is a clear standard and probably does not end at the cessation of
hostilities. Cf. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141 (1948) (holding that the war powers
also include the power to remedy the ill-effects of war for so long as those problems persist, which
could extend beyond the end of hostilities).
66. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer.
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635.
67. Id. at 2639-40.
68. Id. at 2639.
69. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 635.
71. Id. at 636-37.
72. Hamdi therefore does not determine whether the President, acting alone, has the power to
detain American citizens once they are determined to be enemy combatants. However, as historian
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., argues, the President has gradually assumed the war-making power. ARTHUR
M. SCHLENSINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY viii (1973). According to Schlesinger, the
concentration of the war-making power in the Executive "was as much a matter of congressional
abdication as of presidential usurpation." Id. at ix. Although Hamdi and other war powers cases
involve situations where the Executive and Congress appear to work in concert, under Schlesinger's
thesis, Congress does not exercise any real power, relative to the President, during wartime. See, e.g.,
id. at 58-67 (discussing Lincoln's use of the war powers during the Civil War and Congress' failure
to assert itself); see also Yoo, supra note 4, at 182 (noting that "Congress as a body has never sought
to block executive war-making in the courts."). The Hamdi Court's finding that the Authorization for
Use of Military Force is sufficient Congressional approval to make the case a federal war powers case,
rather than a presidential war powers case, is an act of deference in itself.
2005]
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The Court clearly stated, "There is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its
own citizens as an enemy combatant."73 This finding was based solely on Exparte
Quirin.
74
In Quirin, the Court upheld the President's use of a military commission to try
a group of Nazi saboteurs captured inside the United States.7- The FBI captured the
German soldiers in New York and Chicago in 1942.76 The government concluded
that the group came to the United States on German U-boats with the intent to
sabotage domestic war ficilities." The Court upheld as constitutional the
President's decision to try the saboteurs by military commission.78 Congress
previously provided that military commissions had jurisdiction over those being
tried for "offenses against the law of war. '79 The President was therefore acting
pursuant to Congressional authorization when he set up the military commission.8°
The Court found the military was trying the petitioners for offenses against the law
of war because they were "unlawful belligerents."'" A soldier is an unlawful
belligerent, as opposed to a lawful belligerent, when he does not wear insignia
indicating he is in an enemy military force. 2 Being an unlawful belligerent is a
violation of the law of war and therefore within the jurisdiction of the military
commission the President established."3 All six were convicted of violating the laws
of war and were executed. 4
One of the petitioners in Quirin, Franz Haupt, was an American citizen. 5 The
Court addressed, in merely one paragraph, the issue of whether citizens could be
unlawful belligerents. 6 The Court stated that citizens who are members of a
foreign military and "enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy
belligerents. 87 Based on this precedent, the Hamdi Court concluded that no
constitutional bar prevents the government from detaining a citizen as an enemy
combatant.88 Just as a citizen could be an unlawful belligerent, the plurality
analogized, a citizen could also be an enemy combatant.
73. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640.
74. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
75. Id. at 18-20.
76. Id. at21.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 48.
79. Id. at 29.
80. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
81. Id. at 35.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 36.
84. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2669 (2004).
85. Exparte Quinn, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942).
86. See id. at 37-38.
87. Id. at 38.
88. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640.
[Vol. 56:581
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3. The Due Process Requirements
The parties presented wildly different arguments on the existence and meaning
of procedural due process requirements in situations involving the detention of
citizens as enemy combatants. The government argued that the Fourth Circuit
provided Hamdi with all of the due process rights to which he was entitled. 9
Hamdi, however, argued due process required a "proceeding before an independent
tribunal" to determine whether his detention had "a basis in fact and a warrant in
law."
90
The government premised its argument on the notion that the separation of
powers doctrine limited the judiciary's involvement to determining whether a legal
basis existed for the detention, not whether the facts supported Hamdi's
classification as an enemy combatant.9 ' Conceding that the writ of habeas corpus
remains available to citizens detained as enemy combatants, the government argued
that judicial inquiry is limited to whether the military has legal authority to detain
the person.92 The Judiciary simply lacks the "institutional capabilit[y]" to assess the
Executive's military judgment on whether a citizen is an enemy combatant,
according to the government.9 3 At a maximum, the government argued the courts
are limited to determining whether the Executive has made factual allegations
supporting an enemy combatant classification.94 Hamdi counterargued that
separation of powers does not require such deference to the Executive." Rather,
he argued that the separation of powers doctrine requires strong judicial inquiry in
these circumstances to prevent "the collection of power in one branch. '96 Hamdi
also contended that inquiry here comports with the judiciary's basic function.97
Recognizing the competing interests, the plurality used the balancing test from
Mathews v. Eldridge9 to determine what the Fifth Amendment required in this case.
The Mathews balancing test weighs the private interest infringed by the government
action "against the Government's asserted interest, 'including the function involved'
and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process." 99 The
test specifically weighs the risk of erroneous detention against the value of
additional procedural safeguards."° The Court preferred to use this test because of
its consideration of the competing interests at stake.
89. Brief for the Respondents at 47, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
90. Brief for Petitioners at 15-16, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
91. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2645.
92. Brief for the Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
93. Id.
94. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2645.
95. Brief for Petitioners at 24, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
96. Id. at 23.
97. Oral Argument at 2, Handi v. Runisfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
98. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
99. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
100. Id.
2005]
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The Court proceeded to list Hamdi's private interests and said his "interest in
being free from physical detention by [his] own government," is of utmost
importance."0' Nobody can doubt the elemental nature of being free from arbitrary
detention by the government. Liberty properly defined surely includes the freedom
of one's person. °2 The Court went on to say that the circumstances surrounding
detention do not lessen one's liberty interest. 3 The Court recognized that the
possibility of a citizen erroneously being denied liberty is a "very real" risk in such
circumstances."° The plurality also examined the government's interest, which
includes the constitutional delegation of war making to the political branches."0 s
Finally, the Court noted the government's argument that heightened due process
procedures would burden the prosecution of the ongoing war.'°6
In applying the Mathews test, the Court rejected both parties' due process
arguments. It found the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty too high under the
government's proposed procedure. 7 Likewise, the plurality found Hamdi's due
process argument overburdensome to the government. 0 ' The Court stated a citizen-
detainee seeking to challenge his enemy combatant status "must receive notice of
the factual basis for his classification" and have an "opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." 0 9 However, the
nature of this proceeding "may be tailored to alleviate" the burden it places on the
government. "0 Permissible methods for alleviating the burden are: 1) allowing the
admission of hearsay, 2) placing a "presumption in favor of the Government's
evidence," and 3) shifting the burden to the petitioner once the government admits
credible evidence supporting the classification.' The plurality went on to say a
hearing before a military tribunal could meet the due process requirements
described. 2
4. The Assertion of Judicial Power
At the end of its opinion, the plurality made a significant proclamation of
judicial power in this area. "In so holding," the Court stated, "we necessarily reject
the Government's assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily
101. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2004).
102. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring).
103. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646-47.
104. Id. at 2647.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2647-48.
107. Id. at 2648.
108. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2649.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2651.
[Vol. 56: 581
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circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances." 1 3 The Court criticized the
government's separation of powers argument because it would act to accumulate
power in one branch. The plurality recognized that the Constitution may not give
the judiciary a role in making war, but stated the Constitution "most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.""1 4
Accordingly, checks and balances necessarily include the right of a citizen to
contest his detention by the government." 5 In a sweeping statement, Justice
O'Connor wrote that "a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."116
III. HAMDI'S SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRECEDENT
Hamdi is part of a deferential jurisprudence giving broad power and wide
discretion to the political branches during a time of war. The Court has traditionally
given the political branches, particularly the Executive, the expansive power
necessary to wage and win war. The Court views Hamdi's detention as an exercise
of a war powers. By stating its support of judicial review over the exercise of the
war powers involved in Hamdi, the Court makes a rare assertion ofjudicial power
in the war making process, contradicting a long history of judicial abstention.
Although the Court challenges earlier war powers decisions with its support of
judicial review, its practical effect ultimately follows the long-standing tradition of
deference.
A. The Court Analyzes Hamdi as a War Powers Case
The Court analyzed Hamdi's detention as an exercise of the President's war
powers. Furthermore, the Court seems to recognize the Authorization for Use of
Military Force as a declaration of war, at least in determining that a state of war
existed with the Taliban." 7 The Court also recognized the necessity of detaining
enemy forces as "an incident to war.""' The recognition that a state of war exists
is significant in providing the political branches the powers necessary "to wage war
successfully."".9 More precisely stated, the war powers give the political branches
free will in choosing the means of conducting war. 2 ° Indeed, Congress has the
113. Id. at 2650.
114. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 380 (1989) and Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
117. Cf Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 267 (1901) (stating that a declaration of war
serves to place two nations in a state of war).
118. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640.
119. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943).
120. Id.
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broad power to do all that is necessary and proper to conduct the war."z' The
Executive likewise enjoys wide discretion in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the
nation's military and in his duty to faithfully execute the laws.12 2 Thus, the Court
decided Hamdi within a traditional framework of deference to the political
branches, particularly the Executive.
B. A Tradition of Deference to the War Powers
The Supreme Court has traditionally shown the President great respect in the
exercise of the war powers by choosing not to interfere with his decisions in
conducting a war. The Prize Cases remain the major statement on the President's
power to defend the nation from hostile enemies."2 3 These cases dealt with four
ships captured for violating a blockade that President Lincoln instituted following
the attack on Fort Sumter.124 The Court addressed the issue of whether the
President, absent a formal declaration of war, could blockade Southern ports to
suppress the rebellion. 25 It overwhelmingly found the President had the power to
institute the blockade.
126
Finding a duty to defend the country, the Court stated that "the President is not
only authorized but bound to resist force by force." 27 A war, particularly in the case
of rebellion, can exist without a formal declaration of war. 28 Just as important, the
President-and the President alone-has the power to determine what force is
necessary to defend the country.'29 The Court is bound by the President's
"decisions and acts," because the Constitution gave him this authority. 30 The Court
went so far as to say congressional after-the-fact ratification of a President's
encroachment on the legislative war powers works "to perfectly cure the defect." 3'
The Court also has shown deference to the President when he acts in the area
of foreign affairs. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,"' Justice
Sutherland, writing for the majority, acknowledged the "very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations."' The ability to act in foreign affairs is an attribute
121. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506-07 (1870).
122. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950). But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (stating the Commander-in-Chief power does not include the
ability to control private property for war production).
123. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
124. Id. at 636-40.
125. Id. at 643-44.
126. Id. at 671.
127. Id. at 668.
128. Id. at 666-67.
129. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 670-71.
132. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
133. Id. at 320.
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of national sovereignty, according to Justice Sutherland, and is vested solely in the
President as a result of the other branches' inherent limitations.' a4 Curtiss- Wright
involved the President's imposition, pursuant to congressional authorization, of an
arms embargo against certain South American countries.' The Court upheld as
constitutional the appellant's conviction for violating the embargo.'36 While
Curtiss-Wright is open to criticism," Justice Sutherland's opinion undoubtedly
shows deference to the Executive's foreign affairs authority, which encompasses
a number of war-related activities, including engaging in conflict diplomacy and
dealing with foreign hostilities.
The Court's reluctance to review the President's use of the war powers
continued into the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court refused to decide challenges
to the war's constitutionality. For example, the Supreme Court, denying certiorari
in Mora v. McNamara, refused to hear the petitioners' challenge to the legality of
the Vietnam War.'" The Court similarly refused to consider the war's
unconstitutionality in Mitchell v. United States. 39 By failing to reach the merits, the
Court refused to assert judicial review in these cases and again showed great
deference to the Executive. The Prize Cases, Curtiss-Wright, and the Vietnam-era
cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to give the President great authority in
the exercise of the war powers. 4 0
C. Deference and the Power to Detain Citizens
The Court has extended its refusal to exercise judicial review in the war powers
area to the President's power to detain U.S. citizens. In Ex parte Merryman,
President Lincoln claimed his war powers included the right to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus at the onset of the Civil War.' 4' The President had already disobeyed
an order to bring a detained citizen before the court. 42 Chief Justice Taney, sitting
as a circuitjudge, stated that Congress, not the President, held the power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus.'43 However, he concluded the courts were unable to
134. Id. at 315-21.
135. Id. at 312-13.
136. Id. at 333.
137. See Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme
orCurtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'LL. 5 (1988).
138. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
139. 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
140. Judicial abdication when the government asserts its "war powers" is dangerous. As stated
in Federalist No. 51, the distribution of power among the various branches of governments serves to
protect the rights of the people. THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 333 (James Madison or Alexander
Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." Id. at 331.
The judiciary, with regard to the war powers, seems to lack ambition to curb the political branches',
specifically the President's, assumption of power during wartime.
141. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
142. Id. at 147.
143. Id. at 148.
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compel the President's obedience.' Chief Justice Taney stated the judiciary's
power is limited relative to the President's power, which he described as "a force
too strong ... to overcome."' 45 The federal judiciary has no inherent ability to
compel the President's submission to its decisions.'" Chief Justice Taney therefore
recognized that the limitations on judicial power create a defacto power to detain
citizens.
The Court again deferred to the use of the war powers to detain citizens in
Hirabayashi v. United States 47 and Korematsu v. United States.' Both cases
challenged the constitutionality of Japanese internment during World War II. The
President promulgated a military order authorizing the internment, which Congress
subsequently ratified.'49 Because of the congressional ratification, the Court
determined that the sole issue was whether the Congress and President could
implement Japanese internment measures pursuant to their war powers, or, in other
words, whether the measure was a valid exercise of the federal war powers. 5 ' The
Court, noting that the war powers "[are] 'the power to wage war successfully,"'
deferred to the political branches' determination that the internment scheme was an
appropriate response to the possibility of Japanese subversive attacks. '' The Court
upheld a similar military order in Korematsu, where the petitioner (also an
American citizen) challenged a military order excluding him from a particular area
which included his home.5 2 The Court upheld the order despite its "obvious
purpose" to place Japanese Americans in internment camps. 3 As in Hirabayashi,
the Court deferred to the military judgment that detention was necessary to prevent
espionage and sabotage."54
In summation, the Judiciary has traditionally refused to usurp the President's
decisions on how best to execute a war. Further, as demonstrated by Merryman, the
Judiciary would be powerless to enforce a decision that declared an exercise of the
144. Id. at 153.
145. Id.
146. See id. Alexander Hamilton similarly recognized the Judiciary's inherent weakness relative
to the Executive and Congress in Federalist No. 78. Separation of powers, Hamilton argued, delegated
appreciably more power to the political branches. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 496 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). The Executive controls the military, while Congress controls
the purse. Id. The Judiciary, by contrast, has "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merelyjudgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm for the efficacious exercise of this faculty." Id.
A lack of innate power means the Judiciary "can never attack with success either of the other two
[branches]." Id. at 496-97.
147. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
148. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
149. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85-88.
150. Id. at 91-92.
151. Id. at 93, 98-99.
152. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 229.
154. Id. at 218-19, 223-24.
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war powers unconstitutional. The Court decided Hamdi, a war powers case, in this
context and history of deference.
D. Hamdi's Assertion of Judicial Power in Context
The plurality's assertion of judicial power breaks from the Court's traditional
deference to the President's use of the war powers. Hamdi does not seem to
indicate on judicial review when the exercise of the war powers infringes on
citizens' individual liberties. In this respect, Hamdi contradicts the Prize Cases'
statement that the President alone is entitled to determine what force is necessary
to defend the country. Moreover, Hamdi contradicts Korematsu's deference to
military judgment. Suggesting that the judiciary is empowered to review the
President's judgment to the extent it infringes on individual rights goes against that
precedent.
Most importantly, Hamdi's broad statements ofjudicial power-at the expense
of the political branches' war powers-are inconsistent with the spirit of the
precedent. The jurisprudence favors extreme deference and reluctance to review
exercises of the war powers. Rather, the Hamdi plurality strongly rejected Justice
Thomas's statement that "[t]his detention falls squarely within the Federal
Government's war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess
that decision."' 55
Although the Court breaks from tradition by making statements supporting the
use of judicial review, its various holdings defer to the Executive's decision to
detain Hamdi. The Court's empty assertions ofjudicial review create a Potemkin
village,'56 hiding its actual deference to the President's exercise of the war powers.
This Court demonstrated its deference and refusal to challenge the President by
interpreting the anti-detention statute broadly, by finding an expansive holding in
Quirin, and by creating a due process regime that does little to protect the rights of
detained citizens.
IV. DEFERENCE BY INTERPRETING THE PRESIDENT'S STATUTORY AuTHoRrrY
BROADLY
The Court first showed deference to the exercise of the war powers by
interpreting § 4001(a) broadly. Section 4001(a) states that the government cannot
detain a citizen absent a congressional act allowing it to do so. In Hamdi, the Court
held the open language in the Authorization for Use of Military Force provided the
necessary congressional approval to allow the President to detain citizens-a broad
155. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2674 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. "Potemkin village" refers to "any sham or unreal thing." THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD
ENGUSH DICTIONARY 2309 (1993). Typically, the term means a type of facade intended to conceal
something more complex or "create a false picture of progress and prosperity." 12 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 222 (2d ed. 1989).
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construction of what § 4001(a) requires. However, the statute's legislative history
advances a narrow construction of the statute. The legislative history shows that
Congress intended § 4001 (a) to require specific authorization before the President
could detain a citizen. Section 4001(a)'s legislative history not only supports a
narrow interpretation, but creates an inference that a narrow interpretation is the
statute's only correct construction. In sum, the Court deferred to the Executive's
war powers by choosing a broad construction of § 4001(a)'s "act of Congress"
requirement over the narrower and arguably better construction that the legislative
history supports.
A. The Japanese Internment During World War II
The history of § 4001(a) is inseparable from the federal government's
intemrnment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Japanese internment
serves as a reference point for ascertaining the congressional intent of § 4001. After
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government placed many restrictions on
Japanese Americans. 117 Fearing attacks by disloyal Japanese Americans, President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, giving the military authority to "exclude
any persons from designated areas" for national security purposes. 5s As the
President anticipated, the military used the order to exclude Japanese Americans
from certain areas in the West. 59 A massive resettlement resulted. By early 1942,
the government began operating internment camps in the West at the behest of
states unwilling to accept displaced Japanese Americans. 0 The government, on
the President's direction, held more than 100,000 Japanese Americans in internment
camps by mid-1942.'' The Supreme Court upheld the detentions as constitutional
exercises of the war powers.62
Commentators and historians have heavily criticized the internment.'63 For
example, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
criticized the government for interning Japanese Americans without any real
evidence of disloyalty and for failing to treat Americans of German and Italian
ancestry in the same way.' The Commission, writing in 1983, noted the "personal
157. GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE
AMERICANS 74-75 (2001).
158. COMMISSION ONWARTIME RELOCATIONAND INTERNMENTOF CIVILUANS, PERSONALJUSTICE
DENIED 49 (1997).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. at 12.
162. See supra notes 147-54.
163. See, e.g., MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S
CONCENTRATION CAMPS 67-75 (1982) (criticizing the federal government's detention of Japanese
Americans during World War 1I).
164. COMMISSION ON WARTIMERELOCATON AND INTERNMENTOFCMLIANS, PERSONALJUSTICE
DENIED 3 (Civil Liberties Public Education Fund ed. 1997).
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injustice of excluding, removing and detaining loyal American citizens is
manifest."'65
B. The Internal Security Act of 1950: § 4001(a) 's Predecessor
Understanding the Internal Security Act of 1950, the law Congress repealed by
enacting § 4001(a), begins with a look at that Act's history. The Internal Security
Act of 1950 was the product of"a rising wave of intense anticommunism generated
by the unsettled relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R."1 66 Its
stated purpose was to prevent Communist infiltration into the United States.'67 The
Act, for example, prohibited persons from conspiring to establish a "totalitarian
dictatorship" in the United States and prohibited government employees from
associating with members of the Communist party-all subject to criminal
penalties.'
68
Title II of the Act, titled the "Emergency Detention Act of 1950," gave the
President authority to detain any persons reasonably believed to be engaged in
espionage or sabotage during an "internal security emergency." 69 An internal
security emergency arose upon an invasion of the United States, a rebellion in the
country, or a congressional declaration of war. 70 Thus, the Act gave the President
wide authority to detain citizens in a variety of circumstances. The stated purpose
was that such authority was necessary to prevent Communist attacks against this
country. 7 ' The Act did allow for detainees to receive limited process, including
review by a detention board and, following a decision by the board, access to the
courts.' 72 Congress added these procedural safeguards in an effort to calm public
anxiety over "unfettered discretion by the President in a wartime emergency."'73
The Internal Security Act, however, provided de minimis protection for those the
President detained.
The Internal Security Act extended the deference the Supreme Court showed
in Hirabayashi and Korematsu to the President's detention of citizens during
national emergencies. The Internal Security Act gave congressional approval to
detentions by the Executive based only on a declaration of war, or in other
situations at the decision of the President.174 By choosing to replace the Act in
165. Id.
166. Richard Longaker, Emergency Detention: The Generation Gap, 1950-1971, 27 W. POL.
Q. 395, 395 (1974).
167. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, 64 Stat. 987, 987-89 (1950).
168. Id. at 991-92.
169. Id. at 1021 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 813 (1952)).
170. Id. (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 812 (1952)).
171. Id. at 1019-21 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 811 (1952)).
172. Id. at 1021 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 813 (1952)).
173. Longaker, supra note 166, at 396.
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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1971, Congress intended to require something more than a declaration of war to
trigger the President's power to detain citizens.
C. § 4001(a) 's Enactment
Congress enacted § 4001(a) to repeal Title II of the Internal Security Act of
1950.' 7' A sense of insecurity over the 1950 Act's broad grant of power developed
in the country during the 1960s. 76 Memories of the World War II internment, fear
among various social groups (specifically African-Americans and anti-war
protestors), and the dissipating threat of domestic Communism all contributed to
public sentiment favoring the repeal of the 1950 Act. 77 As § 4001(a)'s sponsor
stated, the 1950 Act stood "as a barrier to trust between some of our citizens and the
Government.' 78  The current statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), became law on
September 25, 197 1.7
As noted above, § 4001(a) prevents the President from detaining American
citizens absent an act of Congress."0 Congress considered simply repealing the
Emergency Detention Act but feared doing so would leave the President with power
to detain citizens as was the case before 1950, leaving "citizens subject to arbitrary
executive action."181
Congress intended §4001 (a) to require a specific authorization. The President,
under the 1950 Act and prior Supreme Court rulings, already had the power to
detain citizens pursuant to a declaration of war. Replacing the 1950 Act would
have been unnecessary if Congress intended the President to have the same broad
power to detain under § 4001(a). The effect of the Supreme Court interpretation in
Hamdi is to give the President the same detention power used during World War
II-detentions that occurred after a declaration that was no more specific than
§ 4001 (a). By enacting the statute, Congress intended to prevent another World War
II-type detention of citizens by the Executive. To serve its stated purpose of
preventing World War II-type detentions (which occurred pursuant to a declaration
of war), § 4001(a) necessarily has to require a specific authorization to allow
detention.
175. S. REP. No. 92-304, at 1 (1971).
176. Longaker, supra note 166, at 400.
177. Id.
178. S. REP. No. 92-304, at 3 (1971).
179. H.R. REP. No. 92-968, at 125 (1972).
180. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
181. H.R. REP. No. 92-116, at 5 (1971).
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D. The Court's Broad Interpretation of§ 4001(a)
The Court found that the Authorization for Use of Military Force's "necessary
and appropriate" language satisfied the detention requirement of § 4001 (a). 8 2 The
Authorization, however, does not contain the precise language Congress intended
to be necessary before the President has power to detain citizens. If, in enacting
§ 4001(a), Congress replaced the broad authority that the Internal Security Act
conferred with something more stringent, as the legislative history indicates, the
Authorization is insufficient, because it provides no more specificity than the 1950
Act or Korematsu required. However, Congress did seek to impose requirements
more stringent than those of the Authorization. The Court contradicted its
assertions of judicial power and showed deference to the President by choosing to
broadly interpret § 4001(a), rather than adopting the narrow, more plausible
construction that the legislative history supported.
V. DEFERENCE BYALLOWING THE EXECUTIVE TO DETAIN CITIZENS INDEFINITELY
AS ENEMY COMBATANTS
While making its broad assertions supporting judicial review, the Court held the
President can indefinitely detain citizens as enemy combatants. The Court relied
almost solely on Exparte Quirin in reaching this holding. It chose to interpret the
case and its precedential value broadly. A narrower and equally plausible
interpretation of Quirin was available to the Court, as Justice Scalia argued in his
dissent. However, the Court chose to defer to the President rather than exercise the
judicial power it appeared to support.
A. The Precedent Establishes a Rule of Non-Detention for Citizens
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued the government had been allowed to deal
with citizen combatants in only two ways: 1) suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or 2) criminal charges.83 As he noted, the ability to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and to level criminal charges against citizens engaged in hostility
against the United States dates at least to the nation's founding.'8 4 Scalia also cited
three cases from the War of 1812 supporting the military's inability to indefinitely
detain citizens.'85 However, the case providing the most relevant precedent is Ex
parte Milligan.186
Milligan involved a military commission's sentence of death upon an American
citizen-a resident of Indiana-for conspiring against the United States and aiding
182. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004).
183. Id. at 2665-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2666.
185. Id. at 2667.
186. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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the Southern rebellion during the Civil War. The Court stated the "laws and usages
of war" do not apply to citizens where civilian courts are open and available to
punish the person.'87 The Constitution, according to the Court, protects certain
rights and "[n]ot one of these safeguards can the President, or Congress, or the
Judiciary disturb... .""' UnderMilligan, a citizen must be tried in a civilian court
and detained pursuant to its power, because the military, Congress, and the
Executive lack the authority to subject a citizen to their own will-even in a time
of war.1
8 9
Yaser Hamdi is similar to the petitioner in Milligan in that he was a citizen
detained where the civilian courts were open, the President restrained his freedom,
and he was subject only to the military's judgment. As Justice Scalia stated,
Milligan is not directly on point with Hamdi, but applies by analogy. The
government justified Hamdi's detention on the "laws of war," and the laws of war
do not, under Milligan, apply to citizens when the civilian courts are available. 9
As late as 1957, Reid v. Covert stated Milligan was part of "the deeply rooted and
ancient opposition in this country to the extension of military control over civilians
[including citizens]."' 9' Reid also held that a citizen who is not a member of the
United States military cannot constitutionally be subjected to the judgments of the
military.' 92
B. Hamdi's Deferential Interpretation ofQuirin
As stated above, Hamdi's grant of power to detain citizens indefinitely rested
almost solely on Quirin. Justice Scalia criticized the plurality for mistakenly relying
on Quirin.'93 He first argued Quirin did not apply, because it mistakenly found the
petitioner in Milligan was not an "enemy belligerent" as defined by the laws of
war.'94 Milligan, Scalia argued, applied to all citizens, regardless of their
classification by the laws of war. 95 Second, he argued Quirin did not apply,
because the petitioner's status as a member of the enemy force was undisputed,
187. Id. at 121.
188. Id. at 125.
189. See id. at 121-22.
190. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2668 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957). A possible argument asserts that Hamdi was not a
civilian within the Court's use of the term, because the government alleged he was in an enemy's
military. However, the government never proved Hamdi was a member of any military force.
Additionally, the Court in Reid favorably cited Milligan, where the petitioner was arguably part of the
Confederate military, yet the Court still applied a civilian court requirement to him. Id. at 33; Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22. A logical interpretation of the Reid Court's use of the term "civilian" is
that the reference applied to citizens who were not part of the United States armed forces, even if they
were part of an enemy military force.
192. Reid, 354 U.S. at 39.
193. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2669 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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unlike Hamdi's enemy combatant classification. 9 6 Overall, Justice Scalia took a
very narrow approach to Quirin's applicability to Hamdi's detention and the
President's detention of citizens in general. He preferred, instead, to rely on
Milligan.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, viewed Quirin in much broader
terms. She stated Quirin "both postdates and clarifies Milligan."'97 The fact that
the petitioner's classification in Quirin was undisputed does not matter, because it
still supports detention upon proof of the citizen's enemy combatant status.
19 ' The
plurality adopted a broad view of Quirin, paying little attention to the nuances and
instead emphasizing the case's broader propositions.
The Court again showed great deference to the President by adopting the
broader interpretation of Quirin. Justices Scalia and O'Connor argued legitimate
reasons for discarding and utilizing Quirin as precedent. Justice Scalia took a much
narrower view of the case, which would have resulted in denying the President
authority to detain citizens pursuant to the war powers. The precedent, other than
Quirin, supports this conclusion. The practical effect of viewing Quirin broadly
was to grant the President power to detain citizens indefinitely, at least if they are
proven to be enemy combatants. On the issue of constitutional authority to detain
citizens, the Court adopted a stance that deferred to the President in contradiction
to its strong statements in support of judicial review. The Court had a choice
between the narrow interpretation that Justice Scalia offered and that a strict reading
of Quirin supported, and the broad interpretation that it actually adopted. By
choosing the latter, the Court again demonstrated deference in the practicalities of
its decision despite its remarks on judicial power and review.
VI. A DEFERENTIAL DUE PROCESS REGIME
The Court provided guidelines for a due process regime that strongly favors the
government and placed citizens seeking to challenge their classification as enemy
combatants at a disadvantage. The due process available to citizens challenging
their status is especially important, because the Executive must show that
classification as an enemy combatant is appropriate before the power to detain them
indefinitely arises. In providing a nominal due process regime, the Court
established only a minor impediment to the President's power to detain. The Court
would have provided much more if it were truly concerned with reversing the
traditional deference to the Executive's use of the war powers, as its statements
favoring judicial review appeared to advocate. Again, the Court deferred to the
Executive by essentially adopting the President's classification of a citizen as an
196. Id. at 2670.
197. Id. at 2643.
198. Id.
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enemy combatant. The due process guidelines the Court provided surely do not
pose much of a challenge to that classification.
A. The Court's Reasoning and Due Process Guidelines
The plurality based its due process regime on a balance between Hamdi's
interest in his individual rights and the government's interest, which included the
burden of providing due process.'99 The resulting due process requirement is a
compromise between the process each party argued was appropriate.2" The citizen
seeking to challenge his classification is therefore entitled to "receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." '' More concrete procedures
counter the vague guidelines and work required to accommodate the government's
interest. Such accommodations include the ability to admit hearsay, a presumption
in favor of the government's evidence, and a determination of the citizen's
classification before a military tribunal.
1. Hearsay
Hearsay, according to the Court, may "be accepted as the most reliable
available evidence from the Government .... 202 The government asserted too
many impractabilities would be associated with providing evidence of Hamdi's
capture "half-way around the globe in Afghanistan. '203 The court presumably
decided to allow hearsay in order to relieve this burden. However, the Supreme
Court previously stated in Ellicott v. Pearl that hearsay is disfavored, because it is
not given under oath, the opportunity to confront the witness is lost, and the
possibility of fraud is greater.2°4
The policy reasons in Ellicott are as sound today as when the Court decided that
case in 1836. Indeed, a defendant's right to confront witnesses is "fundamental"
and guaranteed by the Constitution.2 5 By allowing the admission of hearsay, the
Court removes an important due process protection. The government, for example,
could admit the Mobbs Declaration, and Hamdi would have no opportunity to cross-
examine those persons having personal knowledge of his capture. Allowing hearsay
therefore permits the government to introduce evidence that is difficult, if not
199. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2649.
203. Brief for the Respondents at 48-49, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No.
03-6696).
204. Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412,436 (1836).
205. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899).
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impossible, for the detainee to rebut. Detainees' lack of access to evidence and
witnesses also intensifies the difficulty they encounter in rebutting hearsay.
2. A Presumption in Favor of the Government's Evidence
According to the Court, establishing a presumption in favor of the
government's evidence is permissible.206 A traditional presumption allows for the
assumption that a particular fact exists based on the establishment of another fact.2 "7
Thus, a party meets the burden of production once a presumption allows the trier
of fact to infer the presumed fact's existence.20 1 In addition to satisfying a party's
burden of production, a traditional presumption also shifts the burden of production
to the other party.2 9 The onus is on the opposing party to present sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption.210 Presumptions are often necessary to handicap
a party with superior access to evidence or in cases where a party has particular
knowledge of the facts and should consequently bear the burden of proving them.21
Additionally, presumptions are employed against parties with disfavored
contentions or when one party is claiming the existence of an unusual fact and
should therefore bear the risk of failing to meet the burden of production.
2 12
Allowing presumptions in favor of the government's evidence in detainee
classification hearings would serve to disadvantage the citizen-detainees. The
detainee would be required to rebut the government's evidence despite having less
access to the evidence. A detainee would therefore be required to produce evidence
from a far-away battlefield while the government must only produce enough
evidence that creates a presumption of the detainee's enemy combatant status. The
detainee's burden is also heightened, because hearsay is available as a basis for
establishing a presumed fact. Additionally, none of the policy reasons for
employing presumptions apply to this case. The detainee does not have superior
access to the evidence and does not have peculiar knowledge of the facts.
Furthermore, the government has the disfavored contention because of the important
liberty interests at stake when it seeks to detain citizens indefinitely as enemy
combatants.
3. Military Tribunals
The plurality suggested the possible use of military tribunals to conduct the
habeas corpus proceedings. "There remains the possibility," O'Connor wrote, "that
206. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649.
207. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (7th ed. 1999).
208. 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (5th ed. 1999).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 344.
211. Id. §§ 337, 343.
212. Id.
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the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and
properly constituted military tribunal."2 3 The Court noted that military tribunals
already go through similar proceedings when alien detainees want to be classified
as prisoners-of-war for Geneva Convention purposes.2"4 However, military
tribunals do not adequately protect individual liberties. The Court has noted that
military tribunals provide fewer "constitutional safeguards" than Article III
courts." 5 For example, the Court criticized military tribunals in Milligan as means
for the government to circumvent rights that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments guarantee.21 6 In Reid, the Supreme Court expressed concern about
injustice in military courts resulting from "'command influence"' and their failure
to follow constitutional safeguards.2 17 The military courts are also not appropriate
for non-military personnel, because they emphasize military necessity over
individual rights.18
Concerns over the tribunals' adequacy become more important when the
Executive already demonstrates a preference for national security over individual
liberty, particularly when military tribunals, as the Court noted in Reid, are
predisposed to favoring the military interests over individual interests.2 '9 Their
predisposition and the Executive's willingness to disregard civil rights in the current
war could present a major problem for citizen-detainees. The Hamdi Court, in
choosing a military tribunal over the constitutional protections that civilian courts
more fully guarantee, demonstrated its reluctance to challenge the Executive's
enemy combatant classification.
B. The Due Process Regime's Practical Effect
The Court, by allowing hearsay, presumptions, and military tribunals, set up a
due process regime that strongly favors the government. Under this regime, the
detainee seeking to challenge his classification is at a distinct disadvantage. Also
important to note, the Court said that courts and tribunals may have to adjust their
proceedings "to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a
time of ongoing military conflict."22 Thus, the Court gave tribunals discretion to
decide what due process requires, making it possible for a petitioner to face an even
stronger disadvantage. In sum, the Court-created due process regime provides only
nominal protection to the petitioner and eases the Executive's ability to classify a
citizen as an enemy combatant. The Court again demonstrated deference to the
213. Id.
214. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2004).
215. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955).
216. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119-20 (1866).
217. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36,39 (1957).
218. Id. at 39.
219. Id.
220. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004).
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Executive's exercise of the war powers by hesitating to review the President's
enemy combatant classification.
VII. CONCLUSION
One of a citizen's most important rights is to remain free from arbitrary
imprisonment by the government. In Hamdi, the Court announced its ability to
review the Executive's use of the war powers to detain citizens. In doing so, it
made broad, sweeping statements about the Judiciary's power to safeguard
individual liberties, even in a time of war. However, the practical effects of the
Court's decision, particularly a broad interpretation of the detention statute, a broad
interpretation of Quirin, and a due process regime favoring the government, do not
substantially impair the President's ability to detain citizens. The Court's
statements supporting judicial review act as a mask, hiding the broad authority that
the Executive possesses and that the Court reinforced.22
221. Hamdi is the foundation for two civil cases currently pending in the South Carolina Federal
District Court, Padilla v. Hanft, No. 2:04-2221-26AJ (D.S.C. filed July 2,2004) and Al-Marri v. Hanfl,
No. 2:04-2257-26AJ (D.S.C. filed July 8, 2004). The petitioners in both cases are seeking writs of
habeas corpus, arguing, inter alia, that their detention without due process is unconstitutional. Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5-6, Padilla (No. 2:04-2221-26AJ); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
at 11-12, AI-Marri (No. 2:04-2257-26AJ). Both petitioners are also challenging their classifications
as "enemy combatants." Id. While Hamdi's applicability to AI-Marri will probably be limited,
because the petitioner is a non-citizen, the petitioner in Padilla is a citizen. Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 1, Padilla (No. 2:04-2221-26AJ); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, AI-Marri (No.
2:04-2257-26AJ). Padilla is a refiling of a case the Supreme Court decided in 2004. Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). In both cases, the government relies onHamdi as precedent to justify
the detentions. See Respondent's Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla (No. 2:04-
2221-26AJ); Respondent's Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, AI-Marri (No. 2:04-
2257-26AJ).
The Hamdi Court's deferential attitude toward the Executive's classification and detention of
"enemy combatants" will be especially important in Padilla, AI-Marri, and those cases that will
inevitably follow. Hamdi's failure to exercise meaningful judicial review and its deference to the
Executive may foreshadow later decisions. However, Hamdi's statements supporting judicial review
could serve as a building block for future assertions ofjudicial power.
At least one district court is willing to exercise judicial review in the wake of Hamdi to question
the President's handling of terrorism detentions. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C.
2004), the District of Columbia District Court rejected the President's determination that the Geneva
Convention does not apply to enemy combatants. Id. at 160. Hamdan is a Yemeni citizen being held
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id. at 165 n. 11. He was captured during military operations in Afghanistan
in 2001 and charged with conspiracy to commit terrorism and other terrorism-related acts. Id. at 55.
The President determined that Hamdan was eligible to be tried by a military commission, and the
military began the process of trying him accordingly. Id. Citing Quirin and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the court held that the President's military commissions must conform to the Third
Geneva Convention. Id. at 158-60. Therefore, detainees are entitled to the same rights as prisoners-of-
war unless convicted of war crimes by the same courts-martial with jurisdiction over members of the
United States Military. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2004).
The court refused to show deference towards the President and, instead, found that the detainees
are entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention. The government argued courts could
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not review the President's finding that the Third Geneva Convention does not apply, because Hamdan
was not captured during the Afghan War, but during "a 'separate' conflict with A] Qaeda." Id. at 160.
The district court exercised judicial review of the President's determination and held that the Geneva
Conventions were "triggered by the place of the conflict, and not by what particular faction a fighter
is associated with." Id. at 161. The government also argued that a tribunal found Hamdan was not a
"prisoner-of-war" within the Convention's definition. Id. at 161-62. The district court also rejected
this argument, finding that "[t]he President is not a 'tribunal .... ' Id. at *8. According to the court,
the government must establish "a competent tribunal" to determine Hamdan's prisoner-of-war status.
Id. The court also rebuffed the government's argument that the Convention did not create a private
right ofaction. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 163-65 (D.D.C. 2004). Finally, the district
court held the military commission established by the President did not comply with the Convention,
because it offered far fewer protections than courts-martial. Id. at 166-68.
Hamdan demonstrates that some courts are willing to exercisejudicial review over the President's
use of his war powers in the wake of Hamdi. While Hamdan refers to Hamdi only sparingly, see id.
at 162, the Supreme Court's strong statements supporting judicial power must have bolstered the
district court's willingness to use judicial review. The fate of the district court's decision in Hamdan
on appeal remains unclear. See Guy Taylor, U.S. to Defend Use of Guantanamo War Tribunals,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at A03.
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